Abstract-Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service has been a unauthorized mesh node access. In order to address these very popular and important application over the Internet. security problems, some security mechanisms such as mobile Wireless VoIP also becomes more and more popular due to its client authentication and mesh node authentication are needed features of low cost and convenience. Recently, wireless mesh to ensure that only legitimate users and mesh nodes can access network has been considered as a good solution for VoIP services the wireless mesh network and transmit packets. Traffic since it is easy to deploy and provides a larger area coverage. However, the security and performance are the main challenges. encryption is needed if data confidentiality is a requirement. A In this work, we focus on the security issues and present a new lightweight and efficient encryption algorithm can improve protocol for securing the voice traffic over the wireless mesh the network performance. Unfortunately, existing standards network, including the client authentication, intermediate mesh are not sufficient for these security requirements. For example, nodes authentication to ensure secure multi-hop communication, current protocols lack mesh node access control and mutual voice traffic confidentiality and secure optimal routing selection authentication of intermediate mesh nodes. by using the probing packets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, owing to the cost savings and conveniences, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services have gained widespread popularity and still keep growing steadily. For example, a report published by the French telecoms regulator Arcp says the total number of VoIP-based calls doubled in 2006 and accounted for 25% of total fixed line calls in France over the year. Another report shows that at the end of March 2007, 196 million people had registered to use Skype [14] .
On the other hand, wireless networks have the advantages of low cost, mobility support and convenience. A significant benefit of deploying VoIP over wireless networks is to provide users mobility and the possibility of using portable phones. In order to gain wide area coverage, multi-hop wireless mesh networks (WMN) [2] can be used where each A Mesh Node Client mesh node cooperates to route the packets. In a multi-hop wireless mesh network as illustrated in Fig. 1 , each mesh node has at least two interfaces, in which one interface works as an access point allowing mobile clients to associate with, and the In this paper, we focus on security issues for supporting other one is used for communication with other mesh nodes. VoIP over multi-hop wireless mesh networks. Specifically, The ease of deployment and wide coverage make wireless this paper presents a solution that provides both client mesh networks a practical solution for providing VoIP authentication and mutual intermediate mesh nodes services, especially when wired infrastructure is too expensive authentication using the individual key of each node.
and not available.
Moreover it introduces a secure route selection scheme using However, ease of access to the medium makes VoIP over secured probing packets. wireless mesh networks vulnerable to unauthenticated access The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We and malicious misuse. Such vulnerability makes providing first give an overview of related works in Section 2. Then, we security guarantees a big challenge, which has not gained describe the possible attacks on VoIP services in wireless enough attention so far. Possible attacks on VoIP over mesh networks in Section 3, and present our new protocol for wireless mesh networks include traffic eavesdropping, Denial securing VoIP over wireless mesh network in Section 4. We of Service attacks, mesh node impersonation, and conclude the paper and discuss future work in Section 5.
II. RELATED WORKS security threats and the fundamental security requirements of IEEE 802.1X port-based authentication [13] uses the VoIP applications, including confidentiality, integrity and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [1] which availability. Moreover, for time-sensitive applications such as introduces the uncontrolled/controlled port model to authorize VoIP, how to balance the Quality of Service requirements and and control data flow between an access point (AP) and the security requirements is a big challenge. For wireless mesh clients. This standard provides authentication, authorization, networks, the open medium nature, the lack of physical key management and data confidentiality. However, this protection of AP and the multi-hop characteristic make them standard is designed for authentication occurring between the vulnerable to several attacks. In addition, some wireless mesh AP and the mobile client, thus is not suitable for networks suffer from severe capacity and delay constraints. authentication between mesh nodes.
Deploying VoIP over wireless mesh networks will only add to Some studies [6] [11] on VoIP over 802.11 WLAN have the complication of the aforementioned problems, which have been conducted to understand the capacity of VoIP over not been sufficiently addressed so far. In this section, we WLAN. Several methods for improving the performance of describe some possible attacks on VoIP over wireless mesh deploying VoIP over wireless mesh networks have been networks. proposed in [5] , [9] In some schemes, probing packets are sent in order to authentication is performed only at the first network entry. estimate the network condition and ensure the proper Then re-use of key information, i.e. the token generated in the operation of the mesh network. An attacker may flood the first authentication, can speed up the following re-mesh network by keeping sending a high volume of bogus authentication when the client roams to another AP. A hybrid probing packets to occupy the channel or exhaust the resource authentication protocol for wireless mesh networks is of mesh nodes. Therefore, determining the authenticity of proposed in [4] , including mesh node access control by key probing packets is important. eraser procedure, topology authentication and communication authentication. These current mechanisms may not be E. Other Possible Attacks appropriate for securing VoIP application over multi-hop As in other types of wireless networks, wireless mesh wireless mesh network because they do not consider quality of networks are vulnerable to passive eavesdropping, message service requirement.
replaying and man-in-the-middle attacks. All these attacks are easy to launch unless sufficient authentication mechanisms III. SECURITY CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE ATTACKS and cryptographic schemes are performed before the attacker VoIP and wireless mesh network have their ownsrn seurt n in illegitimate access. The authentication and problems respectively. For VoIP, main security problems encryption should be as efficient as possible but robust include identity theft, traffic eavesdropping, spamming over enough. Internet Telephony (SPIT), call tampering and man-in-themiddle attacks. In [7] , the authors discuss various VoIP IV. OUR PROTOCOL key request messages from attackers can be detected since We have described the security problems of and possible only the requesting mobile user can generate a valid permit. attacks on VoIP over wireless mesh network, and have shown This permit can be re-used each time when the mobile user that current standards are not sufficient for addressing these roams to the range of another AP in the same mesh network. security problems. In this section, we present a new secure With a timestamp T the replay attack can be prevented. The protocol that satisfies the following security requirements: 1) permit should be fast generated and easy to verify. We will only a legitimate user can access the mesh nodes and evaluate its performance in our future work. send/receive messages through the wireless mesh network B. Mesh Node Authentication after successful authentication; 2) the mesh nodes know their neighbours such that a malicious node can be detected as soon
In wireless mesh networks, the bogus and compromised as possible; 3) when the probing packets are used to estimate mesh nodes may launch tampering and Denial of Service the delay of each path, bogus probing packets and fake attacks In order to protect the wireless mesh network against responses from malicious nodes are detected and discarded these attacks, sufficient authentication of mesh nodes is early so that only the correct information is used to select the needed. The arele two aspects to consider. First authentication, the secure mutual authentication in IEEE that the traffic is coming from a legitimate neighbour. In this 802.1x with EAP-TLS can be used when the mobile user way, the intermediate node can check the authenticity and access the network at the first time. After this phase, a shared integrity of the traffic such that malicious packets can be secret, called Pairwise Master Key (PMK), is generated discarded as soon as possible. between the mobile user and the authentication server. The We incorporate these two types of mesh node authentication procedure involves a multi-hop path and public authentications into our protocol. The first part is mesh node key cryptography which incurs a high computational overhead. authentication during the initialization phase, and the second Since mobile stations often have energy constraint, an part is mutual authentication between neighbour nodes during efficient re-authentication scheme is necessary. On the other the transit of the packets of the mobile users. hand, the client re-authentication should be robust enough to 1) Initial Mesh Node Authentication prevent attackers from gaining unauthorized access. The During the initialization phase, mesh node authentication authors in [8] propose a token-based re-authentication method. takes place between each mesh node and the authentication In our work, we perform the client authentication based onthis scheme.
server. It is a practical method to use public key cryptography in the initial node authentication since it happens rarely (only Each mobile user has a permit after it registers to the during the first deployment and the re-configuration of authentication server. According to the guidelines in [8] , this wireless mesh networks). It is also reasonable to assume that permit can't be replicated or generated by other mobile users. the available energy of both mesh nodes and the Only the requesting mobile user can generate such a valid authentication server are not impacted by the usage of public credential to prove its identity. This permit can be created by yptography. Suppose each node A and the the mobile user from the pre-defined secret shared between key tcr mobile user and authentication server or derived from its aenticat servery(A) has a public/private key pair, PMK after the first full EAP-TLS authentication if the EAP-PrivKey(AS) assigned by the service provider. After TLS method is used. When the mobile user roams from AP1 to successful authentication, the authentication server will AP2, the mobile user sends the request message with the .. permit tobAPeThen the AP qcest permit with the distribute the group key, denoted as GroupKey, and the passport, Pass(A) to the authenticated node A, encrypted by authentication server. The content of the request message is the node's public key such that only that specific node can shown in Fig. 2 . decrypt it. The group key can be used to provide end-to-end encryption of the traffic transmitted over the mesh network After a call is placed by an end user, the voice traffic impersonation. In order to detect the malicious nodes as soon generated or received by the mobile user is relayed by the as possible, it is important to perform mutual authentication intermediate mesh nodes hop by hop. To ensure authenticity between mesh nodes. In this way every mesh node in the and integrity of the voice traffic, the individual key of each WMN knows its neighbours and the malicious nodes can be node can be used to compute a hash on the forwarded packets. detected at early stage. In multi-hop mesh networks, using When receiving the packets, each node first verifies the hash public key cryptography to authenticate each hop will incur a using the sender's individual key. Then a new hash using its high overhead since it usually involves a multi-hop path. own individual key is computed before sending the packet to Instead, using the symmetric key shared between the next hop such that all the nodes on the path can be neighbouring APs is a practical solution. This key can be used authenticated hop by hop. The group key can be used to to compute a HMAC on the relayed packets to authenticate encrypt the packets if data confidentiality is a requirement. the mesh node hop by hop.
The main advantage of using group key is that during the In our protocol, we perform the mutual node authentication whole transit from the first hop to the last one, only one as follows. Each legitimate mesh node has an individual key, encryption is enough. The incorporation of hop-by-hop denoted as Key, which is only known to the authenticated authentication information is shown in Fig. 6 . nodes within the neighbourhood. Assume each node maintains a list of its neighbours. First, every mesh node broadcasts to Hop by Hop Authentication:
its neighbours an authentication request message which
EGroupKey (MSG) T HMAC (FGoupKey (MSG), T, Key)
contains its certificate and its passport generated with the authentication server's private key. This broadcast message is shown in Fig. 4 . capacity constraints. Since traffic encryption often incurs considerable overhead on the performance of wireless mesh networks, a lightweight secure encryption algorithm is highly Fig. 4 Authentication Request Message desirable. The authors in [3] show that the Tiny Encryption Using the group key and public key of the authentication Algorithm (TEA) is a fast and secure algorithm for securing server, its neighbours can verify the node's identity. In this VoIP. It can be considered as a practical solution to encrypt way, each node gets the certificate of each of its neighbours. voice traffic in wireless mesh networks.
Then each node can send its individual key to all its C. Secure Routing Selection neighbours as shown in Fig. 5 Upon receiving this message, only node B can decrypt it to select the optimal path adaptively. However, their routing get node A's individual key Key(A). Using node A's public selection schemes mainly focus on the performance without key, node B can check the signature to verify the authenticity enough security considerations. For example, because the and integrity can be achieved. After these steps are performed, probing packet needs other mesh nodes to process, an attacker may launch a flooding attack by flooding a mesh node with a end-to-end delay of each path. The HMAC in the probing lot of fake probing packets so as to occupy the resource of packet helps detect the fake or replayed responses. mesh nodes. In addition, a compromised node can send a
In the future work, we will study what key materials should bogus response in advance in order to enhance the chance that be included in the permit such that other malicious users it is included in the selected route or send a delayed bogus cannot duplicate or crack, and the specific HMAC function response to disconnect a legitimate node. Replay attack is that could be used. We will also evaluate the security also possible. In order to prevent and detect the malicious overhead of deploying our protocol, including client node manipulating the routing information, a secure probing authentication, mutual nodes authentication, and traffic packet is needed. In order to detect faked and replayed encryption. We will evaluate the performance of applying response, the probing packet includes a hash computed using a TEA in our protocol in the future work. Moreover, the nonce and the individual key. The secured probing packet is computation of HMAC at each node on the path may shown in Fig. 7 
